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From July until December 2018, I worked in EY Luxembourg – Financial Services Advisory. 
Particularly, I was an intern in the Risk and Regulatory Services department.  
During my internship, I had the chance to work on several projects (i.e. regulatory 
requirements, business proposal for an EU tender on financial services supporting solutions 
for retail investors, communication with several people across the company, clients facing 
role…).  
The major focus was on the PRIIPs regulation. The main goal of this regulation is the 
improvement of the transparency among investment products, through the production of a 
document, the Key Information Document (KID), which discloses the risk-reward profile of a 
certain product. Indeed, EY Luxembourg helps asset managers to fulfil the increasing 
regulatory requirements.  
However, during my work experience, I realized, together with my PRIIPs team, that there are 
several shortcomings related to this regulation. 
Indeed, is the PRIIPs KID really able to give a better overview of the risk?  
Through this report, under the supervision of the manager Saumya Singh, and the professor 
Melissa Prado, I have shown the biggest failures of a specific requirement of PRIIPs, the 
performance scenarios, that the company should consider before advising their clients. 
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Executive Summary 
 
The international financial crisis of 2007, was one of the worst crises in recent history, for its 
magnitude and its impact all over the world.  
In Europe, the crush was turned into a sovereign debt crisis. Despite the European Union (EU) 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) adoption of austere measures as financial support 
condition, the crisis persisted for more than 10 years. As the president of the European Central 
Bank, Mario Draghi1 , said, in 2017 the Eurozone was finally out of the crisis. In essence, 
Greece and Spain have finally exited their bailout program, Portugal and its Prime Minister 
Antonio Costa’s “anti-austerity” government, have cut the deficit to its lowest level in more 
than 40 years.  
However, the recovery has been very slow and still further progresses are needed. The banking 
sector is fragile, and more reforms should be implemented. It is worthless to say that there are 
several factors that led to the crisis. Although, many agree that one of the main causes was the 
lack of a consistent regulation concerning the transparency and accountability requirements in 
the market. The economic system has worked many years without any Supervisory authority to 
control it. Indeed, the financial system has always brought innovative instruments within the 
market. Unfortunately, this innovation was not supported by any new or past regulation, and 
there were no financial intermediaries for the new instruments. Furthermore, the market, excited 
for the innovation and the benefits it could offer without any government intervention, did not 
consider the potential failures.  
As a result, a new regulatory framework has been introduced by the European entities, to ensure 
transparency within the market and the investors. In particular, the PRIIPs regulation, through 
                                                 
1 See « Tel Aviv, Mario Draghi rassicura: “La crisi nell’Eurozona è finita” », Libero Quotidiano, 17th May 2017, available 
at: https://www.liberoquotidiano.it/news/economia/12389347/mario-draghi-crisi-eurozona-finita-ripresa.html 
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the KID, shall enable a decrease in the level of information asymmetries between the retail 
investors and the products’ issuers. Despite its goal, the figures related to the KID could be 
misleading, especially the performance scenarios’ ones. Particularly, as it will be shown further 
in this work, the performance scenarios base their structure on past data and, consequently, they 
are not able to capture the unexpected changes in the price trend of a certain product. 
Furthermore, the missing illustration of past performance is contributing to a not clear 
visualization of the risk related to a product. 
This report has the aim of proving, through the analysis and the tests performed in the Paragraph 
2.2., how the PRIIPs performance scenarios cannot be reliable in all the cases, giving in fact a 
misleading overview on investment solutions.  
Indeed, the work wants to highlight that the scenarios could be misguiding and investors have 
not always the right perception of the risks related to a certain product and could not help in 
reducing the information asymmetries. 
It is important to specify that only PRIIPs Category 2 will be taken into consideration 
(Paragraph 2.1.), as it is the only Category that EY Luxembourg is advising on.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. The Financial Crisis 
 
As is well known, the crisis started in the US around 2006, and it is imputable to the sub-prime 
mortgages. However, its roots date back in 2003, when the number of high-risk mortgages and 
loans increased significantly. The mortgage subscribers were people that, in different 
circumstances, would not have obtained the credit requested, since they did not have the 
necessary guarantees. The factors that have influenced the sub-prime mortgages are related to 
the US real-estate market and to the securitisation phenomenon. In particular: 
- A real-estate bubble was generated by a steady increase in the house prices, from 2000 
until 2006. This performance was encouraged by the Federal Reserve (FED) 
accommodative monetary policy, that kept the interest rates at very low values until 
2004, as a consequence to the Internet bubble crisis, and to the attack on the Twin 
Towers in 2001. 
- The above mentioned Monetary Policy allowed the borrowers (i.e. US families) to 
subscribe mortgages at favourable conditions. The mortgage prices were so convenient 
that the number of subscriptions rose significantly. This boosted the demand for houses, 
and, without any increment on the supply side, it led to a mechanism of steady increase 
of real-estate prices, marking the start of the bubble. Furthermore, the mortgage 
subscriptions were convenient also for the financial institutions, since, in case of default, 
they could have recovered the money through the foreclosure and the resell of the 
houses. 
- The Securitisation was developed, a “procedure whereby an issuer designs a financial 
instrument by merging various financial assets and then markets tiers of the repackaged 
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instruments to investors. This process can encompass any type of financial asset and 
promotes liquidity in the marketplace” (Investopedia definition). Indeed, the credit 
institutions could transfer the mortgages to third parties (i.e. special purpose vehicle – 
SPV, also known as “bankruptcy- remote entity”), once they have been converted into 
asset-backed securities2. As a result, these institutions could receive money before the 
mortgage maturities. The securitisation ensured (at least apparently) banks to get rid of 
the default risk. This weakened the willing to value properly the customer’s reliability. 
On the other hand, the SPV financed the acquisition of sub-prime mortgages through 
the short-term securities offer to investors. Therefore, the procedure of securitisation, 
together with the lack of an accurate valuation of the assets, allowed the banks to spread 
highly risk products within the markets.  
Considering the low-interest rates, the asset-backed securities were very attractive for both US 
and European investors, who started to invest in these products. As a consequence, first the risk, 
and consequently the crisis, could expand also in the Eurozone. 
The securitisation contributed to modify the banks’ business model from “originate and hold”, 
to “originate and distribute”. This means that the banks could have recovered the money lent 
immediately, through securitisation, and then, they could have used the resources for more 
mortgages to unreliable borrowers. The financial institutions increased their assets and 
liabilities in relation to the equity (leverage phenomenon). The related profits were high, but 
the risk of default was also significant. All these products were sold over the counter (OTC), 
not in a regulated market. In these circumstances, considering the difficulties of their valuation, 
the role of the rating agencies has been increasingly important. However, the ratings were 
subject to model and assumptions, which were not accurate and precise.  
                                                 
2 See the Investopedia definition: “An asset-backed security is a security that is backed by a pool of loans or receivables. These 
include: auto loans, consumer loans, commercial assets (planes, receivables), credit cards, home equity loans, and 
manufactured housing loans.” 
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In 2004, the FED set the interest rates at a higher level, due to the economic revival. The 
mortgages became more expensive and the number of the defaulted debtors rose. The real-
estate demand decreased, and the bubble burst, causing substantial direct and indirect damages. 
The financial institutions that were more involved, suffered heavy losses. Furthermore, from 
2008, the rating agencies downgraded the credit ratings of many asset-backed securities. Most 
of the securities widely distributed in the markets, became illiquid. Because of the uncertainty, 
the interbank market experienced a sharp rise in rates. The credit availability was tightened, 
bringing on a confidence crisis first, and then a liquidity one. The banks suffered because of the 
SPV and clients default risk exposures, respectively as an asset-backed securities holder and as 
a direct counterparty. Most of the largest financial institutions went bankrupt: some of them 
were saved by FED, and others went defaulted (i.e. Lehman Brother), highlighting additional 
concerns about the confidence of the market participants. As a result, the interest rates increased 
and the market liquidity was rapidly reduced. 
Shortly, because of the European banks’ direct or indirect exposure to the subprime mortgages, 
the crisis moved from the US market to European markets, affecting the real economies of the 
two countries. Northern Rock, one of the biggest UK institutions within the real-estate market, 
went bankrupt and was nationalized by Bank of England.  
The income and the employment levels decreased, the banks limited the number of loans, the 
market stock crashed and the real-estate prices declined dramatically. These affected the level 
of consumptions and investments, lowering the world trade.  
At that point, it was urgently needed an intervention by that the Supervisory Authorities and 
the international bodies, concerning the policies and the regulations for the financial markets. 
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1.2. The new European Regulatory Framework 
 
It seemed necessary to focus on the rating agencies, the hedge funds and all the products traded 
OTC. The old regulations were entirely revised, from the capital requirements to the accounting 
policies, as well as the firms’ governance policies, related to the managers’ compensations and 
the risk management. 
In 2009, the Council of the European Union approved the setting up of the European Systemic 
Risk Board, focused on the financial stability control within Europe. Furthermore, the Council 
elected 3 European Supervisory Authorities, which are: 
- The European Banking Authority (EBA), dedicated to the banking system control3, 
- The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), dedicated to 
the insurance and pension system control, 
- The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), dedicated to the securities 
market control, at an international level. 
 
                                                 
3 In 2014 was introduced the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (2014/59/EU), to support the activities of this entity. 
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Figure 1: The European System of Financial Supervision 
 
The goal of these new entities was to guarantee a stable and uniform growth, all over Europe. 
For this purpose, the European Commission published in 2015 a “green paper” for the EU 
Capital Markets Union. Together with the idea of a unique capital market, there was also the 
idea of a unique banking system: in 2014 came into force the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM 4 ), to mitigate the heterogeneous regulatory approaches of the different European 
countries, while in 2014 was established the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM5), for a 
unique supervisory mechanism. 
The Supervisory arrangements were just the beginning; then, also the regulatory framework 
was modified.  
The new Financial Services Action Plan directives were focused on all the weakness which 
have come to light in the existing supervisory framework as a result of the crisis. In particular, 
they were focused on: 
- The financial intermediaries and the markets: in 2012 the Short-Selling Regulation 
was approved (Regulation UE 236/12). It enables the identification of the short-selling 
operations that could have a negative impact on market stability. Furthermore, in 2014 
the EU Council approved the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II6), 
which provides more transparency to the transactions and more efficiency within the 
financial instruments’ markets.   
- The market infrastructures: in 2012 have come into force the Central Securities 
Depository Regulation (CSDR) concerning the market infrastructure, the derivatives’ 
trade (especially OTC instruments), the securities’ management in UE and the central 
                                                 
4 Regulation EU 1024/2013. 
5 Regulation EU 806/2014. 
6 The MiFID II is a result of the Directive 2014/65/UE and the Regulation UE 600/2014. 
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depositors’ operations. Other relevant regulations are the UE 648/2012 (EMIR), which 
offers more transparency within the market infrastructures, and the UE 909/2014, which 
goal is to make efficient the operations within the market. 
- The credit and the intermediation: concerning the shadow banking7, the Directive 
2011/61/UE, also known as the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive 
(AIFMD), monitors the hedge funds’ activities, the Regulation 345, also known as 
EuVECA, is dedicated to the venture capital, while the Regulation 346, known as 
EuSEF, is related to the social entrepreneurship European funds. Concerning the 
banking intermediation, the Basel Committee approved several directives. The most 
relevant are the Directive 2013/36/UE and the Regulation 576/2013, or CRD IV. These 
increase the minimum capital requirements, to reduce the potential losses related to 
moral hazard problems and to the bankrupt costs. 
- The rating agencies: in 2013 new rules concerning the rating agencies were approved. 
Their main goal is to decrease the potential overreliance on the credit ratings.  
-  The products’ and the issuers’ information disclosures:  the new regulatory 
framework includes rules about the investors’ protection, through the strengthening of 
the information disclosures’ requirements.  Indeed, this is the key factor to reduce the 
information asymmetries between the financial products’ issuers and the retail investors. 
Furthermore, considering the free movement within the EU markets, it is important to 
ensure the completeness and the comparability of the information. To meet this 
challenge, the Packaged Retail and Insurance-based Investment Products (PRIIPs8) 
Regulation came into force. It enables the comprehension and the comparability of the 
products’ key characteristics, as it is explained in the following paragraph, “The PRIIPs 
                                                 
7 See the Investopedia definition: “A shadow banking system is the group of financial intermediaries facilitating the creation 
of credit across the global financial system but whose members are not subject to regulatory oversight.” 
8 Regulation UE 1286/2014, supplemented by the Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/653. 
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Regulation”.  Another important directive is the 2013/50/UE, known as Transparency 
Directive, dedicated to the issuers’ information disclosures. 
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2. The PRIIPs regulation 
 
As mentioned above, the European Parliament, through the Regulation n. 1286 (November 
2014), has confirmed that the disclosure requirements concerning the investment products are 
necessary for the retail investors to understand the risks related to these products, while taking 
investment decisions. Indeed, both the manufacturers and the distributors, used to provide for 
each product a prospectus9. However, this document was too long and complex to be read. This 
discourages any careful reading: the client would trust completely the advice and the 
explanations offered by the distributors, which have a conflict of interests since the 
management wants them to sell a certain type of products. 
The Regulation is not dedicated to all the financial products, but only to the Packaged Retail 
and Insurance-based Investment Products (PRIIPs), meaning an investment, including 
instruments issued by special purpose vehicles as defined in point (26) of Article 13 of Directive 
2009/138/EC or securitisation special purpose entities as defined in point (a) of Article 4(1) of 
the Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, where, regardless of 
the legal form of the investment, the amount repayable to the retail investor is subject to 
fluctuations because of exposure to reference values or to the performance of one or more 
assets which are not directly purchased by the retail investor.10 
The scope of the Regulation is to ensure the PRIIPs’ information disclosure, and consequently, 
to restore the investors’ confidence, damaged by the crisis. 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Information sheet 
10 See the Article 4 of Regulation (UE) n. 1286/2014 concerning the Key Information Documents, issued by the European 
Parliament and Council on the 26th of November 2014. 
It is available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R1286&from=IT 
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2.1. The PRIIPs regulatory technical standards 
 
The European Commission presented a first version of the Key Information Document (KID) 
regulatory technical standards (RTS) in 201611. Then, in 2017 a new one was introduced to the 
European Parliament12, with some amendments concerning the KID document, including a 
section dedicated to the methodology for assessing and presenting the risk of the PRIIPs. 
On the 1st January 2018, the Regulation came into effect in all the Member States. Its main 
requirement is a standard document, known as KID, which consists of maximum 3 sides of an 
A4-sized paper, which should be delivered to the retail investors before any purchase 13 . 
Through this document, the investors have access to the key characteristics of each PRIIP, 
allowing them to make better investment decisions. Indeed, the investors could compare 
different PRIIP KIDs realized by different manufacturers. 
Particularly, according to the regulation, the KID is a briefing document, which aims to: 
- Provide general information about the product; 
- Identify and analyse the level of the risk for each PRIIP, “in the form of a risk class by 
using a summary risk indicator (SRI) having a numerical scale from 1 to 7”14; 
- Identify and analyse 4 different payoffs in three different time periods, known as 
performance scenarios; 
- Identify and analyse all the costs related to the PRIIP. 
It is important to specify that, for the purpose of the risk assessment, the regulation divide the 
PRIIPs into 4 categories: 
- Category 1, which includes all the high-risk products (i.e. the potential losses are higher 
than the amount invested), and all those products for which is not easy to compute the 
                                                 
11 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU), of 30 June 2016, supplementing the Regulation (EU) n. 1286/2014.  
12 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU), 2017/653 of 8 March 2017, supplementing the Regulation (EU) n. 1286/2014. 
13 See Annex 1: KID Template 
14 See the Article 3 of Regulation mentioned in footnote 13, point 2-a) 
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level of the risk, because of the lack of historical data or the lack of related benchmarks 
(i.e. Contract For Difference – CFD); 
- Category 2, which includes all the products whose payoffs are a linear function of the 
underlying investments (i.e. mutual funds or ETFs) 
- Category 3, which includes all the products whose payoffs are not a linear function of 
the underlying investments (i.e. Structured products); 
- Category 4, which includes all the products whose values do not depend on factors 
observable on the market (i.e. Insurance-based products, Guaranteed Interest rate with 
profit sharing). 
As previously mentioned, for the purpose of this report, only PRIIPs belonging to the Category 
2 will be analysed. 
 
2.2. The PRIIPs Shortcomings – Performance Scenarios 
 
Several amendments were implemented within the regulation, between 2014 and 2016. Most 
of them concerned the performance scenarios, as it was (and still is) one of the most critical 
RTS. Actually, as specified in the regulation, the performance scenarios “shall be presented in 
a way that is fair, accurate clear and not misleading15”. Furthermore, the KIDs should provide 
a forward-looking analysis of the potential return the investor could get, considering the initial 
amount invested (usually 10,000 for any currencies, as suggested by the Regulation), over 3 
different periods (1 year after the initial investment, half of the recommended holding period, 
the recommended holding period), under different scenarios. In essence, the scenarios 
implemented are an unfavourable scenario, a favourable scenario, a moderate scenario and 
recently a stress scenario has been introduced to capture all the adverse impacts not included in 
                                                 
15 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU), 2017/653 of 8 March 2017, supplementing the Regulation (EU) n. 1286/2014. 
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the unfavourable scenario. Through the illustration of the potential performances related to a 
certain investment, the investor could compare them with the ones of other products, and take 
a more informed investment decision. To compute these performance scenarios, the KIDs 
producers follow the guidelines specified within the regulation. In general, all calculations 
should be carried out using the historical fund prices, which length depends on the frequency 
of available data: 
- Daily: at least 2 years of available prices; 
- Weekly: at least 4 years of available prices; 
- Monthly: at least 5 years of available prices. 
A widely used risk management measure is the Value at Risk (VaR), which is used to compute 
the maximum potential loss that an investor would expect to incur on a certain investment 
position. It is a probabilistic measure that captures, in a certain time horizon N, with a 97,5% 
of confidence level, the potential loss exceeding the 2,5%. In essence: 
𝑉𝑎𝑅0,0975 =  −
1
2
𝜎2𝑁 + 𝑧0,025𝜎√𝑁 
, where 𝜎 is the volatility of the LN returns, N is the time horizon for which the VaR is 
calculated and 𝑧0,025 equals -1,96. 
However, the returns of the investment products are often skewed and their distribution does 
not follow the Gaussian curve. Since the VaR measure assumes that the returns are normally 
distributed, then it would lead to inaccurate results while computing the potential risks related 
to a product.  
For this reason, it has been considered the Cornish – Fisher Expansion (CFE) in the PRIIPs 
methodology. Indeed, this method is based on the four moments of the distribution, and can 
convert a normal variable into a non-normal one.  
CFE = [𝑧𝛼 +
(𝑧𝛼
2 − 1)
6
𝑆 + 
(𝑧𝛼
3 − 3𝑧𝛼)
24
𝐾 −
(2𝑧𝛼
3 − 5𝑧𝛼)
36
𝑆2] 
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, where S represents the skewness and K the excess kurtosis of the distribution. 
The ESAs introduced the CFE in the performance scenarios calculation. 
 
For the unfavourable scenario, the formula is: 
𝑥 = 𝐸𝑥𝑝 (𝑀1𝑁 + 𝜎√𝑁 (−1,28 + 0,107
𝜇1
√𝑁
+ 0,0724
𝜇2
𝑁
− 0,0611
𝜇1
2
𝑁
) − 0,5𝜎2𝑁)16 
, where 𝐸𝑥𝑝 means “Exponential of”; 𝑀1 is the mean of the distribution of all the observed 
returns in the historical period; 𝑁 is the number of trading days, weeks or months within the 
RHP (i.e. if the RHP is 5 years and the frequency of the data is daily, then 𝑁 5*~252 = 1260); 
𝜎 is the volatility of the distribution; 𝜇1 is the skew of the distribution and 𝜇2 is the excess 
kurtosis of the distribution. It is important to specify that the unfavourable scenario value is 
captured by the 10th percentile of the distribution. Consequently, the 𝑧𝛼 is approximately -1,28. 
 
For the favourable scenario, the formula is: 
𝑧 = 𝐸𝑥𝑝 (𝑀1𝑁 + 𝜎√𝑁 (1,28 + 0,107
𝜇1
√𝑁
− 0,0724
𝜇2
𝑁
+ 0,0611
𝜇1
2
𝑁
) − 0,5𝜎2𝑁)17 
The items needed are the same listed and described for the unfavourable scenario formula. It is 
important to specify that the favourable scenario value is captured by the 90th percentile of the 
distribution. Consequently, the 𝑧𝛼 is approximately 1,28. 
 
For the moderate scenario, the formula is: 
𝑦 = 𝐸𝑥𝑝 (𝑀1𝑁 −  𝜎 
𝜇1
6
 − 0,5𝜎2𝑁) 
                                                 
16 As specified, the regulation requires the Cornish-Fisher Expansion for the calculation of the scenarios, which is based on 
the four moments of the distribution, as shown in the formula CFE = [𝑧𝛼 +
(𝑧𝛼
2−1)
6
 
𝜇1
√𝑁
+  
(𝑧𝛼
3−3𝑧𝛼)
24
𝜇2
𝑁
−
(2𝑧𝛼
3−5𝑧𝛼)
36
 
𝜇1
2
𝑁
]. 
17 See footnote 16. 
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The items needed are the same listed and described for the unfavourable scenario formula. It is 
important to specify that the favourable scenario value is captured by the 50th percentile of the 
distribution. Consequently, the 𝑧𝛼 is approximately 0. 
 
The evaluation of the stress scenario is different from the other ones and requires additional 
sub-calculations. The first step is identifying an appropriate length of the sub-interval (different 
for the recommended holding periods 1, 3, and 5 years), according to the table provided: 
 1 year >1 year 
Daily prices 21 63 
Weekly prices 8 16 
Monthly prices 6 12 
Figure 2 - Length of the sub-intervals 
 
Two approaches have been dominant in this area. 
Approach 1  
For the observations of the prices use the intervals to construct subsets of the prices, for each: 
𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑀 − 𝑥 + 1 
, where the price set: 
{𝑃𝑖, 𝑃𝑖+1, … , 𝑃𝑖+𝑤−1} 
, contains exactly 𝑤 elements. This interval corresponds to 𝑤-1 observed returns: 
{𝑟𝑖+1, 𝑟𝑖+2, … , 𝑟𝑖+𝑤−1} 
 
Approach 2  
For the observations of the prices use the intervals to construct subsets of the prices, for each: 
𝑖 = 0,1, … , 𝑀 − 𝑤 
19 
 
, take the price set: 
{𝑃𝑖, 𝑃𝑖+1, … , 𝑃𝑖+𝑤+1} 
, which contains “𝑤 + 1” elements. This interval corresponds to 𝑤 observed returns: 
𝑟𝑖+1, 𝑟𝑖+2, … , 𝑟𝑖+𝑤 
The main difference is driven by only one observation. However, in the case of weekly and 
monthly data for the first year it is a considerable influencer. For the scope of this report, it has 
been decided to extend the number of observations and adapt the second methodology. 
Following that, the formula used in the rolling volatility calculations is: 
𝜎𝑆𝑖
𝑤 = √
∑ (𝑟𝑗 − 𝑀1)𝑖
𝑖+𝑤 2𝑖+𝑤
𝑗=𝑖
𝑀𝑤
 
, where: 
𝑀𝑤  - is the count of the number of observations in the sub-interval (equal to 𝑤), 
 𝑀1𝑖
𝑖+𝑤 = 𝐴𝑣𝑔(𝑟𝑖+1 , 𝑟𝑖+2 , … , 𝑟𝑖+𝑤) – is the mean of all the historical lognormal returns in the 
corresponding sub-interval. 
From these volatilities, the stressed volatility is calculated by taking the value that corresponds 
to the 99th percentile for the first year and the 90th percentile for the following holding periods 
(3 and 5 years). The stressed volatility is denoted by: 
𝜎𝑆
𝑤  
The formula for the Stressed Scenario is as follows: 
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 = 𝑒
𝑘 
, where: 
𝑘 = 𝜎𝑆
𝑤 √𝑁 (𝑍𝛼 + (
𝑧𝛼
2−1
6
)
𝜇1
√𝑁
+ (
𝑧𝛼
3−3𝑧𝛼
24
)
𝜇2
𝑁
− (
2𝑧𝛼
3−5𝑧𝛼
36
)
𝜇1
2
𝑁
) − 0,5 𝜎𝑆
2𝑁𝑤 . 
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From this formula, it can be deduced that the skewness and the kurtosis used, are the ones taken 
from the entire distribution of returns since there is no subscript in 𝜇1 and 𝜇2 that indicates a 
rolling skewness and kurtosis. 
 
These figures and disclosures required in the KIDs are not always clear and could misguide the 
investors. Particularly, the figures related to the performance scenarios can be easily 
misinterpreted.  
First of all, as previously mentioned, the performance scenarios are based on past data, which 
consist of funds’ historical prices. Usually, through a time series of 5-year prices, the potential 
amounts and the potential returns are predicted, for 3 different future time periods.   
However, a structure which bases the computation of future data exclusively on past data, 
cannot be totally accurate. Indeed, if the past returns of a certain fund were positive for all the 
time series taken into consideration, the performance scenarios will be as well positive. The 
opposite is true; if the last 5 years’ data are negative, then the prediction related to the 
performance scenarios will be very pessimistic.  
Consequently, the results related to the scenarios could be inaccurate and couldn’t help 
investors in making more informed investment decisions: the scenarios and the actual returns 
of the investment product could mismatch. 
As an example, it has been considered the iShare Core S&P 500 - IVV, an ETF exposed to large 
American firms, which tracks the S&P 500 index. Particularly, the analysis wants to highlight 
the difference between the potential results that investors would have obtained according to 
performance scenarios in 2008, and the actual score they gained in reality.    
As it is shown in the figure below, which represents the historical prices, the ETF is 
characterized by an increasing trend from 2003 until the beginning of 2008. The spike that 
follows this period is due to the financial crisis.  
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Figure 3 – IVV historical prices values 
 
Therefore, it has been assumed an investor could have invested 10.000 dollars in this product 
in January 2008, with a recommended holding period of 5 years. According to the performance 
scenarios methodology, collecting 1.261 daily prices form 2003 until 200818 to obtain 1.260 
observations in terms of LN returns (= 5 years * 252 working days), after one year (2009), the 
investment would have given back a return of almost 30% in the best scenario and a return of                 
-14,48% in the worst case (see the figure below). 
 
Performance scenarios 
 11 33 5 
Unfavourable scenario amount 10.099,350 9.955,385 11.074,685 
Unfavourable scenario return 0,10% -0,15% 2,06% 
Moderate performance amount 11.007,060 13.328,085 16.138,537 
Moderate performance return 10,07% 10,05% 10,05% 
Favourable scenario amount 13.016,244 17.826,786 23.495,924 
                                                 
18 Prices downloaded from the Thomson Reuters datascope. 
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Favourable scenario return 30,16% 21,25% 18,63% 
Stress Scenario amount 8.551,938 5.576,233 4.614,244 
Stress Scenario return -14,48% -17,69% -14,33% 
 
Figure 4 – IVV performance scenarios values 
 
However, the actual annual return at the beginning of 2009 was around -24% since, as 
illustrated in Figure 3, the prices values significantly decreased in a very short time (the return 
has been computed through the collection of 253 daily prices from 2008 until 2009, the 
calculation of 252 LN returns, and then, the computation of the annual average return for that 
period). 
In 2011 (2nd period) the actual return was more close to the scenarios’ results, due to the increase 
in the ETF prices and was around 12% (the actual return has been computed through the 
collection of 757 daily prices from 2008 until 2011, the calculation of 756 LN returns, the 
computation of the annual average return for that period), while in 2013 the high values reached 
by the product led to an annual return of 47% (the actual return has been computed through the 
collection of 1.261 daily prices from 2008 until 2013 (3rd period), the calculation of 1.260 LN 
returns, the computation of the annual average return for that period).  
Through this example, it can be said that the PRIIPs performance scenarios are not always an 
accurate disclosure of the potential risks and returns. On one hand, none of the scenarios, even 
the stress scenarios, is not able to capture the severe effects of an unexpected crisis; on other 
hand, the favourable scenario is not able to capture possible significant increase of the 
investment values. In reality, the markets are affected by shocks (both positive and negative) 
that the PRIIPs methodology often cannot predict. In this way, investors could be misguided 
and could choose the “wrong” investment product, since they are not concerned of the real risks 
related to it. 
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Consequently, “past data are not always good representation of future results”.  
Another example that supports this statement, is the analysis below. 
A general ETF, not related to an index which suffered the crisis, the iShare MSCI South Africa 
ETF, has been taken into consideration. This specific fund is characterised by a high volatility. 
For this product, daily prices have been collected from 2010 until 201819. Furthermore, it is 
assumed an investment in each product in 2015 and a recommended holding period of 5 years 
(i.e. the first period ends in 2016, the second in 2018 and the third one, in 2020). The 
performance scenarios have been calculated using 1.261 data from 2010 until 2015 to obtain 
1.260 observations in terms of LN returns (= 5 years * 252 working days).  
Performance Scenarios 
Rec. Holding Periods In Years 1 3 5 
N 252 756 1260 
Interval Length (W) 21 63 63 
Percentile 1% 5% 5% 
Z alpha -2,326 -1,645 -1,645 
WϬs (Stressed Volatility) 0,031 0,023 0,023 
Unfavourable Scenario  0,748 0,638 0,588 
Moderate Scenario 1,044 1,137 1,239 
Favourable Scenario 1,457 2,028 2,615 
Stressed Scenario 0,288 0,287 0,185 
 
Figure 5 – MSCI SA performance scenarios values 
 
                                                 
19 Prices downloaded from the Thomson Reuters datascope.  
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As it is shown in the table above, at the end of the first period, a certain investor could get back 
from this product a value of 0,748 for the unfavourable scenario; 1,044 for the moderate 
scenario; 1,457 for the favourable scenario and 0,288 for the stress scenario (these values should 
be then multiplied by 10.000 which is assumed to be the amount invested in the product). 
Although, the actual annual value in 2016, which is approximately 0,56 (the value has been 
computed through the collection of 253 daily prices from 2015 until 2016, the calculation of 
252 LN returns, and then, the computation of the exponential value of the annual average return 
for that period), is not corresponding to any of the scenarios results. The same is true in the 
second period (2018) since the historical value is almost 1,4 (the value has been computed 
through the collection of 757 daily prices from 2015 until 2016, the calculation of 756 LN 
returns, and then, the computation of the exponential value of the annual average return for that 
period) due to changes in prices, not taken into consideration within the scenarios’ results, as 
shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 6 – MSCI SA historical prices values 
 
In general, it can be said that, the PRIIPs methodology is not always able to capture the high 
volatility, and therefore, to give a full and complete understanding of the investment proposed. 
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Indeed, the retail investor should take the results given by the scenarios, only as an 
approximation and an indication of the future performance and should consider this while 
taking investment decisions.  
A solution to this problem could be the introduction of the Montecarlo simulation. Indeed, the 
method has an important role in the stochastic simulation and is already widely used as a 
technique to assess the investment risk. Particularly, the Montecarlo simulation, assuming that 
the future cash flows are related to stochastic variables, could indicate the entire probability 
distribution of the output (e.g. potential returns), and not just a point estimate. This would also 
allow measuring the risk- and the reward profile of the investment project through a statistical 
dispersion. The elements needed for the method are 4: 
- Parameters, (i.e. specific inputs as the prices of the product/investment); 
- Exogenous shocks (i.e. input that cannot be predicted, but can be defined in terms of 
probability, as the shock in prices); 
- Outputs (i.e. simulation results, as the returns that the investor could get back by 
investing in a certain product/investment); 
- Model (i.e. mathematical equations that could describe the relationship between the 
outputs, the inputs, and the parameters). 
 
The results would be more accurate compared to the actual performance scenarios, but it should 
be said that it would be not easy to set-up the method within a database such as SQL, and this 
is the reason why companies like EY Luxembourg have not implemented this for the Category 
2 of PRIIPs. 
 
However, the projection through past data is not the only shortcoming related to the PRIIPs 
performance scenarios. Indeed, these can be misleading in different ways. 
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For the analysis two funds are considered. The related prices have been collected from 2013 
until 2017. Fund 1 has an annual volatility of 0,005739, while Fund 2 has an annual volatility 
of 0,006583, as shown in the figures below. 
M1 -1,9E-06 
Volatility  0,005739 
Skewness -14,4506 
Excess kurtosis 372,36 
                   
               Figure 7 – Fund 1 statistical measures                                                   Figure 8 – Fund 2 statistical measures 
 
Even if the volatility of Fund 1 is lower than the volatility of Fund 2, the potential return that 
the investor could get back in the stress scenario after 1 year would be worst if he/she would 
invest in the first fund. As presented in Figure 7, the return the investor would receive, would 
be -83,58% for Fund 1 and, as clearly shown in Figure 8, it would be higher if he would invest 
in Fund 2, since the return would be -41,14%. 
Performance scenarios 
Unfavourable scenario amount 8.825,17 8.011,07 7.479,27 
Unfavourable scenario return -11,75% -7,13% -5,64% 
Moderate performance amount 10.092,42 9.999,54 9.907,52 
Moderate performance return 0,92% 0,00% -0,19% 
Favourable scenario amount 11.029,45 11.927,68 12.541,71 
Favourable scenario return 10,29% 6,05% 4,63% 
Stress Scenario amount 1.642,49 7.420,35 6.809,32 
 Stress Scenario return -83,58% -9,47% -7,40% 
M1 0,000218 
Volatility  0,006583 
Skewness -0,82411 
Excess kurtosis 4,068608 
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Figure 9 – Fund 1 performance scenarios values 
 
Performance scenarios 
Unfavorable scenario amount 9.187,94 9.198,40 9.494,39 
Unfavorable scenario return -8,12% -2,75% -1,03% 
Moderate performance amount 10.517,54 11.613,33 12.823,29 
Moderate performance return 5,18% 5,11% 5,10% 
Favorable scenario amount 12.003,84 14.618,80 17.268,00 
Favorable scenario return 20,04% 13,49% 11,54% 
Stress Scenario amount 5.886,32 6.282,83 5.421,92 
Stress Scenario return -41,14% -14,35% -11,52% 
 
Figure 10 – Fund 2 performance scenarios values 
 
The reason behind this mismatching between volatility and scenarios’ results can be found in 
the past performance: as the two figures below show, Fund 1 has a spike (i.e. significant 
decrease in price on the 15/01/2015). Indeed, as previously specified, the stressed volatility is 
computed by taking the value that corresponds to the 99th percentile scenario; this means that 
the spike is captured and over-weighted, leading to worst performance scenario at the end of 
the first year for Fund 1, compared to Fund 2.   
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Figure 11 – Fund 1 historical prices values 
 
 
Figure 12 – Fund 2 historical prices values 
 
 
A solution could be the inclusion of the past performance in the form of past prices within the 
performance scenarios’ section. Therefore, the retail investor would have more information 
about a certain investment/product. He/she could have a better overview on the trend of the 
different products and indeed, he could take a more accurate investment decision. 
The disclosure of the past performance would also be important for investors in other cases.    
 For the analysis two funds are considered. The related prices have been collected from 2014 
until 2018.   
29 
 
 Fund 3 and Fund 4 have the same statistical measures (mean, volatility, skewness and excess 
kurtosis), as shown in the figures below.                                                                                                
M1 -3,6E-05 
Volatility  0,003099 
Skewness -0,97424 
Excess kurtosis 8,791433 
 
              Figure 13 – Fund 3 statistical measures                                                  Figure 14 – Fund 4 statistical measures 
 
This would lead to the case in which the two funds have approximately the same performance 
scenarios, as shown in Figures 13 and 14. 
  
Performance scenarios 
Unfavorable scenario amount 9.291,67 8.692,01 8.248,92 
Unfavorable scenario return -7,08% -4,57% -3,78% 
Moderate performance amount 9.902,67 9.701,08 9.503,59 
Moderate performance return -0,97% -1,01% -1,01% 
Favorable scenario amount 10.536,42 10.809,41 10.931,01 
Favorable scenario return 5,36% 2,63% 1,80% 
Stress Scenario amount 7.280,22 8.164,11 7.678,49 
Stress Scenario return -27,20% -6,54% -5,15% 
 
Figure 15 – Fund 3 performance scenarios values 
 
M1 -3,6E-05 
Volatility  0,003099 
Skewness -0,97424 
Excess kurtosis 8,791433 
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Performance scenarios 
Unfavorable scenario amount 9.291,67 8.692,01 8.248,92 
Unfavorable scenario return -7,08% -4,57% -3,78% 
Moderate performance amount 9.902,67 9.701,08 9.503,59 
Moderate performance return -0,97% -1,01% -1,01% 
Favorable scenario amount 10.536,42 10.809,41 10.931,01 
Favorable scenario return 5,36% 2,63% 1,80% 
Stress Scenario amount 7.280,22 8.164,11 7.678,49 
Stress Scenario return -27,20% -6,54% -5,15% 
 
Figure 16 – Fund 3 performance scenarios values 
 
 
As a result, an investor could be indifferent between Fund 3 and Fund 4. 
 
Figure 17 – Fund 3 historical prices values 
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Figure 18 – Fund 4 historical prices values 
 
 
However, as it is clearly shown in the figures above, the funds have two opposite past 
performance trends, in terms of past prices. This would be an important information that could 
affect the investors’ decisions and could increase the level of comparability among investment 
products. 
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3. Conclusion 
 
As a response to the crisis, the ESAs have improved many regulations, such as PRIIPs, to 
increase transparency and allow an investor to take a better investment decision.  
However, there are some shortcomings in the regulation. Particularly, as shown in the examples 
above, the performance scenarios’ figures could be misleading. 
The 8th on November 2018, the ESAs have published a paper20, proposing several changes for 
the PRIIPs KID, with a focus on the scenarios.  
Among these, there is the inclusion of the past performance, since it became clear how the 
disclosure of historical trends could help investors. EY Luxembourg is planning to include the 
products’ price trends within the performance scenarios’ section, and, if available, also the 
related benchmark trends. This would allow its clients to have a better overview of a certain 
product/investment. Furthermore, the company is working to set in a proper way the Montecarlo 
simulation for PRIIPs Category 2 within the SQL database, to limit the problems related to the 
past data for the performance scenarios’ calculation. 
The ESAs would include the changes before the end of 2019 within the PRIIPs regulation, and 
particularly, within the KIDs to increase the transparency and the level of comparability among 
different products, so that investors would have a more accurate perception of the risks related 
to these instruments. 
   
 
 
                                                 
20 See references, ESAs “Joint Consultation Paper concerning amendments to the PRIIPs KID” 
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5. Annex 
 
5.1. KID Template 
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5.2. Performance scenarios template 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
